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  1Education and income inequality in the regions of the European Union 
Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical study of the determinants of income inequality across regions of 
the EU. Using the European Community Household Panel data set for 102 regions over the period 
1995-2000, it analyses how microeconomic changes in human capital distribution affect income 
inequality not only for the whole of the population but also for normally working people. Human 
capital distribution is measured in terms of both educational attainment as well as educational 
inequality. Income and educational inequalities are calculated by a generalised entropy index (Theil 
index). Different static and dynamic panel data analyses are conducted in order to reduce 
measurement error on inequalities and minimise potential problems of omitted-variable bias. Taking 
into account the specification tests applied to the estimated models, the regression results reveal 
that, while the relationship between income inequality and income per capita is positive, the long-
run relationship between income inequality and educational attainment is not statistically 
significant. This paper also agrees with the current belief that educational inequality has a positive 
relationship with income inequality. Across European regions high levels of inequality in 
educational attainment are associated with higher income inequality. This may be interpreted as the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. The above results 
are robust to the definition of income distribution. Other results indicate that population ageing and 
inactivity are sensitive to the specification model, while work access and latitude are negatively 
associated to income inequality. Urbanisation has a negative impact on inequality but for the whole 
of the population only. Furthermore, the relationship between unemployment and income inequality 
is positive. Female participation in the labour force is negatively associated with inequality and 
explains a major part of the variation in inequality. Finally, as expected, income inequality is lower 
in democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, and in regions with Nordic family structures (i.e. 
Swedish and Danish regions). 
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  21. Introduction 
It is often claimed that greater educational attainment makes societies more egalitarian, and 
income and educational inequalities are perfectly correlated (Checchi 2000). But, in spite of 
these claims, the influence of education on inequalities is still a long way from being 
perfectly understood, especially at a regional level. This paper addresses the questions of 
the supposed negative relationship between educational attainment and income inequality 
and of the positive correlation between inequality in education and in income for the 
regions of the EU. Our methodology is based on the estimation of various specification 
models (both static and dynamic) in order to assess the sensitivity of the relationships. 
This aim of the paper is to analyse how microeconomic changes in human capital 
distribution affect income inequality, not only for the whole of the population, but also for 
normally working people. Human capital is generally a multidimensional concept and has 
been defined by the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (1998, p.9) as ‘the knowledge, skills, 
competences and other attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic 
activity’. In this paper human capital distribution is measured in terms of both average 
education of the population and inequality in educational attainment. By analysing the 
microeconomic processes underpinning the relationship between individual educational 
endowments and income inequality, we also expect to draw greater light on whether 
government education policies contribute to a more equal income distribution and whether 
EU labour market is responsive to differences in qualifications, knowledge and skills. 
The paper is organised in five additional sections. The next section reviews the existing 
debate over the determinants of income inequality, putting greater emphasis on the 
relationship between income and educational distribution. The empirical regression model 
and the relevant static and dynamic estimation methods are discussed in Section 3. Section 
4 describes the data and the construction of variables. Section 5 reports and discusses the 
regression results and, finally, Section 6 concludes with policy recommendations and some 
suggestions for further research. 
 
  32. Theoretical considerations 
There is a vast literature on the determinants of income inequality. It is therefore not the 
aim of this section to review this vast array of sources, but simply to focus on how the 
impact of income per capita, as well as of average and inequality in education on income 
inequality is perceived by the literature. In order to do that, we will first review the link 
between income and inequality, followed by the analysis of the impact of educational 
attainment and inequality on income inequality. The dynamic structure of inequalities is 
also considered. 
Changes in the distribution of income take place at a very slow pace. There are several 
reasons for this. First, people are often reluctant to change jobs for psychological and 
institutional reasons (Gujarati 2003). Additionally, income levels are often perpetuated 
from one generation to another by means of inheritance, cultural background and, more 
generally, characteristics of the community (Bourguignon and Morrisson 1990; Cooper, 
Durlauf et al. 1994; Durlauf 1996; Checchi 2000). This allows for intergenerational 
stability in income, denoting the existence of a positive autocorrelation in inequalities. 
Cooper (1998), for instance, has pointed out that families from poor communities or 
wealthy communities tend to exhibit higher intergenerational income stability than families 
living in middle income communities. Hence, it is often the case that a proportion of the 
population remains trapped at low and high levels of income for more than one generation. 
Income persistence is often viewed (i.e. Lane 1971) as an essential characteristic of 
rewarding achievement and, particularly, of ensuring that the most suitable persons are 
allocated the most suitable roles. The presence of inequalities in income provides an 
additional incentive to achievement and innovation which are an integral part of modern 
society. Some degree of inequality is generally perceived as a necessary constituent of a 
healthily functioning economy (Champernowne and Cowell 1998, p.14). According to 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993), the persistence of income 
inequalities across generations is possible only if capital markets are imperfect. High 
intergenerational correlations imply less mobility in the income distributions. The question 
is whether the persistence of inequality has an impact on economic performance. Do 
unequal societies perform better than more equal ones? 
  4This relationship has been most famously addressed by Kuznets (1955). Income per capita 
has an inverted U-curve effect on income inequality (Kuznets 1955). Income inequality 
increases as nations begin to industrialise and, then, declines at later stages of 
industrialisation. This relationship is known as ‘Kuznets curve’ and was formalised later by 
Knight (1976a; 1976b), Robinson (1976) and Fields (1979). The Kuznets curve shows that 
in the early stages of industrialisation, labour force is engaged in agriculture. As 
industrialisation proceeds, workers move from the larger agricultural sector to the smaller 
industrial one and since wages are usually higher in the industrial sector, this migration 
boosts even more income inequality (Firebaugh 2003). Therefore, income distribution 
firstly becomes more unequal as income increases. At a very advanced stage of economic 
development, income inequality and income per capita are negatively related. More 
explicitly, according to the neoclassical economic theory, as the agricultural sector shrinks 
and the industrial one increases in size, further movement from the agricultural sector to the 
industrial one reduces, rather than increases, income inequality. Therefore, development is 
inegalitarian in the early stages of development and becomes egalitarian at the later stages. 
The factors behind the inverted U-curve effect of income per capita on inequality are 
industrialisation and labour migration. Some other factors behind this association are 
market and government failures, government social expenditures and financial service 
development. De Gregorio and Lee (2002), for example, show that income inequalities are 
negatively correlated with government social expenditure. Schultz (1962) pointed out that 
modifications in income transfers and in progressive taxation are relatively weak factors in 
altering the distribution of income. Motonishi (2000; 2006) argues that the effect of 
financial service development on income inequalities is not straightforward. On the one 
hand, developed financial services enable the poor to borrow from the rich and this leads to 
a decrease in income inequality; and on the other, developed financial services are often 
unavailable for the poor due to credit market constraints arising from information 
asymmetries. Finally, market failures, such as credit constraints and monopsony or 
monopoly power and government failures, often positively affect income inequalities 
(Graham 2002). 
Despite the significant amount of the research that has tried to test whether the Kuznets 
curve works at the national level, the results are ambiguous (i.e. Ahluwalia 1976; Papanek 
  5and Kyn 1986; Anand and Kanbur 1993; Bourguignon and Morrisson 1998; Checchi 2000; 
Motonishi 2006). Ahluwalia (1976), for instance, finds for a cross-section of counties 
evidence to support the inverted U-curve, while Anand and Kanbur (1993), in contrast, 
report that the Kuznets curve is not inverse at all. Overall the literature seems unable to 
provide conclusive empirical results on the relationship between income inequality and 
income per capita, because social structures, such as historical heritage, religion, ethnic 
composition and cultural traditions, across countries evolve differently (Checchi 2000). In 
this paper, we do not expect to test the validity of the Kuznets curve, because firstly, the 
majority of the relevant empirical studies are based not only on European but also on less 
economically advanced countries (i.e. African countries) and secondly, because these 
studies show that the declining segment of the Kuznets curve begins approximately from 
1970 (Nielsen and Alderson 1997). But we use Kuznets’ theory in order to assume a linear 
association between income per capita and income inequality for developed countries over 
a relatively limited period of time. We thus expect that over the period 1995-2000 income 
per capita has a negative effect on income inequality. 
The notion of education as a factor behind income differences also has a long history, going 
back to Adam Smith (Griliches 1997). Stemming from the work of Schultz (1961; 1962; 
1963), Becker (1962; 1964) and Mincer (1958; 1962; 1974), income inequality is generally 
considered to be affected by educational attainment, which is sometimes called ‘skills 
deepening’ (Williamson 1991). Higher educational attainment is achieved through 
improvements in access to education (i.e. lower tuition fees, better education financing, 
improved vocational training), higher quality of education (i.e. better services of teachers, 
librarians and administrators) and greater investment in physical capital for education. 
Improving access to education, for example, is likely to raise the earning opportunity of the 
lowest strata, leading to lower earning inequality (Checchi 2000)
1. Furthermore, a 
widespread access to education allows for a more informed participation in the market 
economy, reduces the lobbying ability of the rich, while simultaneously increases the social 
                                                 
1 Income inequality, at least in industrialised countries, is explained by a rise in earning inequality (Gottschalk 
and Smeeding 1997; Cornia, Addison et al. 2001). Hence inequality in pay is definitely an important 
component of total income inequality (Blinder 1974; Brown 1977). 
  6and job opportunities of the poor, implying lower inequality. According to the World 
Bank’s statement, education is one of the most powerful instruments known for reducing 
income inequality (World Bank 2002). Education, in addition, facilitates numerous 
favourable changes for individuals, because it reflects abilities, choices and preferences 
(Hannum and Buchmann 2005). Educational achievement is not only process of 
credentialing, but also an instrument for higher level of aspiration tending people to be 
more informed and therefore getting specific traits which are likely to increase productivity. 
Increasing the educational preferences raises the individual’s occupational outcomes and 
subsequent economic status. Eliminating for instance tuition fees, people are more likely to 
obtain degrees and enrol in graduate school. The recent studies of Eicher and Garcia-
Penalosa (2001), De Gregorio and Lee (2002) and Heshmati (2004) illustrate that higher 
educational attainment contributes to make income distribution more equal. 
According to Knight and Sabot (1983), the impact of educational attainment on income 
inequalities depends on the balance between the ‘composition’ and the ‘wage compression’ 
effect. Concerning the ‘composition’ effect, an increase in the levels of education of the 
population tends, at least initially, to increase income inequality. With respect to the ‘wage 
compression’ effect, education tends to decrease income inequality. An increase in the level 
of education reduces the wages of high-educated workers, because their supply goes up; 
and simultaneously raises the wages of the low-educated workers, because their supply 
goes down. Nevertheless, an increase in the educated labour supply is likely to increase 
competition for positions requiring advanced educational credentials and thereby should 
reduce the income differential between the educated and uneducated people (Tinbergen 
1975; Lecaillon and International Labour Office 1984). Moreover, an increased proportion 
of the population attain higher education leads to inflation in the value of educational 
credentials and in the long run to the decreasing wage of high-educated workers. Thus the 
effect of education on income inequality rests on a supply and demand effect. 
The effect of educational attainment on income inequality also depends on the type of 
education. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) support that public education reduces income 
inequality more quickly than private education does. Cardak (1999) extends the work of 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and shows first, that heterogeneous preferences increase 
  7income inequality and second, public education can overcome the added heterogeneity and 
reduce income inequality. Promoting public education causes the distribution of income to 
become less skewed, because although the poor are taxed for revenue, they enjoy the 
benefits of the public education system. Hence one way to decrease income inequality is 
the increased support for public education. 
A different perspective on the relationship between income and education is given by 
Spence’s (1973; 1974; 1976) signalling model. This model depicts that education has no 
direct effect on income distribution, because education acts as a ‘label’ or ‘signal’. More 
specifically, his model posits a situation in which the possibility of higher pay of more 
educated people has nothing to do with academic and vocational skills, because formal 
education is seen as an elaborate device for detecting and labelling those who have skills 
(Champernowne and Cowell 1998; Wolf 2004). The education level is more related with 
innate ability and with psychological and personality traits, such as diligence, and these are 
what employers reward, rather than regarding education as a means of instilling or 
enhancing skills (Wolf 2004). Differences in educational attainment can arise as a 
consequence of heterogeneity in ability. Galor and Tsiddon (1997b) and Hassler and Mora 
(2000), for example, support that individuals with a higher level of innate cognitive ability 
can deal better with less knowledge than others do. They state that talented individuals are 
also more productive and choose a high rate of technological growth. Genetic 
characteristics are highly correlated with the education children receive and their skills. In 
contrast, Lopez, Thomas et al. (1998) supports the notion that education levels are not 
necessarily correlated with abilities. Nevertheless, education still works as a marker for 
achieving better jobs. To sum up, given the complexity of the relationship between 
education and income, it is difficult to predict a priori the sign and the significance of the 
relationship between educational attainment and income inequality. 
Finally most theoretical analyses tend to report that income and educational inequality are 
positively correlated (Jacobs 1985; Glomm and Ravikumar 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier 
1993; Galor and Tsiddon 1997a; Chakraborty and Das 2005). More explicitly, Thorbecke 
and Charumilind (2002, p.1488) have pointed out that, with regard to the supply side of 
skilled labour education, a greater share of high-educated workers within a cohort may 
  8signal to the employers that those with less education have lower ability, and hence the 
latter’s earnings may be reduced accordingly, which may also lead to larger wage 
inequality between high and low education workers. With respect to the demand side of 
skilled labour education, if the demand for unskilled labour is either contracting or growing 
at a slower rate than the demand for skilled labour, then earning inequalities will increase. 
Taking into consideration Bowles’ (1972) statement, more equal education could achieve 
significantly greater equality of economic opportunity and incomes possible without 
challenging the European institutions and without requiring any major redistribution of 
capital. Human capital inequalities may be an important cause of occupational disparities 
across social groups and thereby a cause of income inequalities. Since education offers 
economic opportunities to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the poor but talented 
people can achieve appropriate positions in the European economy regardless their social 
background, improving their relative standing (Hannum and Buchmann 2005); and elites, 
on the other, can manage to maintain their socioeconomic status by getting more education 
than the masses (Walters 2000). Therefore, the positive relationship between income and 
educational inequality is likely to highlight the responsiveness of the European labour 
market to differences in qualifications and skills.  
Extremely low income individuals might face credit constraints that prevent them from 
taking up a profitable education level (Dur et al., 2004). They also face constraints if credit 
markets are imperfect. Hence, because of borrowing constraints and incomplete markets, 
the incentive of poor people to invest in education depends on their parental wealth. 
Two of the most salient empirical works that focus on the impact of educational distribution 
on income inequality are Becker and Chiswick (1966) and Park (1996). Both studies 
illustrate that a higher level of educational attainment of the labour force has an equalising 
effect on income distribution and the larger the inequality in educational attainment, the 
greater the income inequality. 
 
3. Econometric approach 
  9As a means to test whether the above-reported findings hold in a European regional 
context, using microeconomic data, this paper estimates income inequality as a linear 
function of per capita income, educational attainment and educational inequality. We use 
different empirical specifications in order to assess the robustness of the econometric 
models and to examine the impact of adding control variables, such as population aging, 
work access, unemployment and inactivity. The methodology incorporates variability both 
across regions   and over time  . It constitutes a pooled cross-sections analysis. Our 
emphasis is on the case where 
) (N ) (T
∞ → N  with T  fixed and on the one-way error component 
model, due to the limited number of observations. Different panel data analyses are 
conducted in order to reduce measurement error on inequalities and minimise potential 
problems of omitted-variable bias. Panel data also allow for greater degrees of freedom 
than with time-series or cross-regional data and improve the accuracy of parameter 
estimates (Hsiao 2003; Baltagi 2005). The combination of time-series with cross-regions 
can enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only 
one of these two dimensions (Gujarati 2003). 
This study deals with two methods of panel regression analysis: static and dynamic models. 
These models are increasingly popular for panel data analysis among regional science 
researchers. With repeated observations of 102 regions, panel analysis permits us to study 
the dynamics of change with short-time series. The static models endow regression analysis 
with both a spatial and temporal dimension. The first dimension pertains to a set of cross-
regional units of observation, while the second one pertains to periodic observations of a set 
of variables characterising these cross-regional units over a particular time span. There are 
several types of static panel data analytic models. The static methods of panel estimation 
presented here are pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FEs) and random 
effects (REs). These models are the most widely used ones in panel regression analysis. 
They allow us to use the pooled regression model as the baseline for our comparison. As 
the surveys of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data set were conducted 
regularly at approximately one-year interval, the error terms of inequality regressions are 
expected to be correlated with the regional-specific effect. This can be dealt with the FEs 
models in which the error terms may be correlated with the regional-specific effects. 
Nevertheless, according to Yaffee (2003), the FEs models are not without their drawbacks. 
  10These models may frequently have too many cross-regional units of observations requiring 
too many dummy variables for their specification. Too many dummy variables may sap the 
model of sufficient number of degrees of freedom for adequately powerful statistical tests. 
He also says that a model with many such variables may be plagued with multicollinearity, 
which increases the standard errors and thereby drains the model of statistical power to test 
parameters. If these models contain variables that do not vary within the groups, parameter 
estimation may be precluded. This study also includes dynamic models due to the short 
time period of analysis. For instance, the equilibrium in wage and thus in income may be 
constrained in the short-run, because of supply rigidities or factor immobilities that in the 
longer-run are removed (Combes, Duranton et al. 2005). The dynamic models tests for the 
existence of autocorrelation. In these models, finally, we can obtain both short-run and 
long-run parameters. To sum up, in order to examine the impact of education on income 
inequality and to evaluate the robustness of the results, we experiment with a number of 
alternative specifications and include additional determinants to our equations. 
More specifically, our econometric analysis starts with a static panel data model of the form 
it i i it it z x y ε ν γ β + + + = ' ' 
with   denoting regions ( ) and t time ( i N i ,..., 1 = 6 ,..., 1 = t )
2.   is income inequality,   
is a vector of explanatory variables,   is a vector of time-invariant explanatory variables 
(urbanisation and latitude), 
it y it x
i z
β  and γ  are coefficients,  i ν  is an unobserved regional-specific 
effect (unobserved heterogeneity) and  it ε  is the disturbance term with  0 ] [ = it E ε  and 
 (idiosyncratic error). The term 
2 ] [ ε σ ε = it Var it i v ε +  is the composite error. 
When dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population, we consider 
population ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity as time-variant explanatory 
variables, while when dependent variable is income inequality for normally working 
people, we consider only population ageing as time-variant explanatory variable. 
                                                 
2   denotes 1995, …,   denotes 2000   1 = t 6 = t
  11We then consider the role of welfare state, religion and family structure on income 
inequality. These are explanatory variables, represented by dummies in the static panel data 
model. Our analysis takes on the following form: 
it i i it it d x y ε ν η β λ + + + = ' ',  
where  η  are coefficients and   is a vector of dummy variables with  i dλ λ  denoting 
categories ( m ,..., 2 = λ ). If a qualitative variable has   categories, we introduce  m 1 − m  
dummy variables (categories). Category   is referred to as the base category. 
Comparisons are made with that category (Gujarati 2003). 
i d1
This static model is characterised by one source of persistence over time due to the 
presence of unobserved regional-specific effects. As has been mentioned, the presented 
static methods of panel estimation are pooled OLS, FEs and REs. To evaluate which 
technique is optimal, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the regional-
specific effects and the regressors, among others
3. Both FEs and REs estimators are based 
on the strict exogeneity assumption. Hence the vector of the explanatory variables (  and  it x
                                                 
3 First, the pooled OLS estimator assumes that the unobserved regional-specific effect is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables and each region is independent and identically distributed, ignoring the panel structure 
of the data and the information it provides (Johnston and Dinardo 1997). The resulting bias in pooled OLS is 
caused from omitting a time-constant variable and is sometimes called heterogeneity bias (Wooldridge 2003, 
p.439). Second, the FEs estimator (or within estimator) assumes that some or all of the regressors are 
correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity. Besides, the main reason for collecting panel data is to allow 
for the unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2003, p.440). 
The FEs estimator is obtained by removing the unobserved regional characteristics which is a potential source 
of bias. More specifically, it is a pooled OLS estimator that is based on the time-demeaned variables. The FEs 
estimator also requires that there be within-group variation in all variables for at least some groups. We 
therefore introduce a year dummy variable with the urbanisation and latitude variables (time-constant 
variables) in order to see whether the effect of urbanisation and latitude has changed over 1995-2000. Third, 
the REs estimator assumes that the regional-specific effects are uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables 
in all time periods. The provided efficient estimator of the REs model in this study is the generalised least 
squares (GLS) estimator. Both the FEs and the REs models deal with heterogeneity bias. The former treats the 
 as fixed effects to be estimated, while the latter treats the   as a random component of the error term.  i v i v
  12i z ) is strictly exogenous. The usual diagnostic tests also are presented. Hausman’s (1978) 
chi-squared statistic tests whether the REs estimator is an appropriate alternative to the FEs 
estimator. Another critical diagnostic test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) statistic which is a test of the REs model against OLS model. LM test is a 
test for regional effects. Large values of LM statistic favour the REs model. 
In the static models, we assume that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic with the 
same variance across time and regions. However, heteroskendasticity potentially causes 
problems for inferences based on least squares. Assuming homoskedastic disturbances in 
the FEs model, for example, might be a restrictive assumption for panels (Baltagi 2005). 
Thus when heteroskedasticity is present, the consistent estimates are not efficient. If every 
it ε  has a different variance, the robust estimation of the covariance matrix is presented 
following the White estimator for unspecified heteroskedasticity (White 1980). 
There are a variety of different techniques that can be used to estimate a dynamic model of 
the form: 
it i i t i it t i it z x x y y ε ν γ ζ β δ + + + + + = − − ' ' ' 1 , 1 ,        ( 3 )  
with   denoting regions ( ) and t time ( i N i ,..., 1 = 6 ,..., 2 = t )
4.   is income inequality, 
 is the first lagged income inequality,   is a vector of explanatory variables,   is a 
vector of first lagged explanatory variables,   is a vector of time-invariant explanatory 
variables (urbanisation and latitude), 
it y
1 , − t i y it x 1 , − t i x
i z
δ ,  β , ζ  and γ  are coefficients,  i ν  are the random 
effects (unobserved regional-specific effects) that are independent and identically 
distributed over the panels and  it ε  is the disturbance term with  0 ] [ = it E ε  and 
 (idiosyncratic error). It is assumed that the 
2 ] [ ε σ ε = it Var i ν  and the  it ε  are independent for 
each i over all t. 
This dynamic model is characterised by two sources of persistence over time: 
autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors 
                                                 
4   denotes 1996, …,   denotes 2000.  2 = t 6 = t
  13and unobserved regional-specific effects (Baltagi 2005). Pooled OLS, FEs and REs 
estimators are now biased and inconsistent, because econometric model contains a lagged 
endogenous variable (Baltagi 2005). 
The dynamic panel structure of our data is exploited by a generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimation suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) (Arellano-Bond estimation). 
The main idea behind GMM estimation is to establish population moment conditions and 
then use sample analogs of these moment conditions to compute parameter estimates 
(Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2003; Baltagi 2005). Arellano and Bond first transform the 
model to eliminate the regional-specific effect ( i ν ). The observed urbanisation ratio ( ) is 
eliminated as well. The first-differencing transformation is: 
i z
) ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , − − − − − − − − + − + − + − = − t i it t i t i t i it t i t i t i it x x x x y y y y ε ε ζ β δ , (4) 
where all variables are expressed as deviations from period means. Models in first 
differences usually face the problems arising from the non-stationarity of the data. The 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error is handled by instrument 
variables (IVs). In Arellano-Bond estimations, the predetermined and endogenous variables 
in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels, while the strictly 
exogenous regressors can enter the instrument matrix in first differences. For instance, for 
1997 ,   is an instrument for  ) 3 ( = t 1 , i y ) ( 1 , 2 , i i y y −  and not correlated with  ) ( 2 3 i i ε ε −  as 
long as the  it ε  themselves are not serially correlated; for 1998  ) 4 ( = t ,   and   are 
instruments for  , and so on. This procedure is more efficient than the Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981; 1982) two stage least squares estimator which does not make use of all of 
the available moment conditions (Ahn and Schmidt 1995). Anderson and Hsiao use 
 or   only as an instrument for 
1 , i y 2 , i y
) ( 2 , 3 , i i y y −
) ( 3 , 2 , − − − t i t i y y 2 , − t i y 2 , 1 , − − − t i t i y y . The Arellano-Bond structure 
provides a large number of IVs by GMM estimator. The Arellano-Bond framework, which 
is called ‘difference GMM’ (GMM-DIF), treats the dynamic model as a system of 
equations, one for each time period. 
In our model, we assume that the explanatory variables might be: 
a.  strictly exogenous, if  0 ] [ = is it x E ε  for all t and  ,  s
  14b. predetermined,  if  0 ] [ ≠ is it x E ε  for  t s < , but  0 ] [ = is it x E ε  for all  , and  t s ≥
c. endogenous,  if  0 ] [ ≠ is it x E ε  for  t s ≤ , but  0 ] [ = is it x E ε  for all  ;  t s >
except for population ageing which is definitely a strictly exogenous variable. 
The GMM methodology is based on a set of diagnostics. First of all, it assumes that there is 
no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic errors
5. Additionally, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed Sargan’s test (1958) of over-identifying restrictions. 
The Sargan test has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution in the case of homoskedastic 
error term only. Both the homoskedastic one-step and the robust one-step GMM estimators 
are presented. The two-step standard error model is not recommended, because it tends to 
be biased downward in small samples (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998). 
It also should be mentioned that treating variables as predetermined or endogenous 
increases the size of the instrument matrix very quickly. This implies that GMM estimators 
with too many overidentifying restrictions may perform poorly in small samples (Kiviet 
1995). 
The dynamic model is also used in order to obtain short-run and long-run parameters. The 
short-run effect of an independent variable is the first year effect of a change in this 
variable, whereas the long-run effect is the effect obtained after full adjustment of income 
inequality. The short-run effect of the variable x is β  and its long-run effect is 
δ γ β − + 1 . Long-run standard errors are calculating using the Delta method (Greene 
2003). 
Broadly speaking, the advantage of dynamic over static models is that the former correct 
the inconsistentcy introduced by lagged endogenous variables and, also, permits a certain 
degree of endogeneity in the regressors. 
 
4. Data and variables 
                                                 
5 The consistency of the GMM estimator relies upon the fact that  0 ] [ 2 , = Δ Δ − t i it E ε ε  (Arellano and Bond 
1991, p.282). 
  15The quantitative data used to estimate the econometric models come from the ECHP data 
survey conducted by the EU during the period 1994-2001 (wave2-wave8) and the 
Eurostat’s Regio data set. In the surveys individuals were interviewed about their 
socioeconomic status. Data stemming from the ECHP can be aggregated regionally at 
NUTS I or II level for the EU15. Unfortunately there are no data available for the 
Netherlands. Finnish regions had to be dropped from the sample because of the 
discrepancies between the regional division included in the ECHP and those in the Regio 
databank, the source of the macroeconomic variables. The resulting database includes 102 
NUTS I or II regions from 13 countries in the EU
6. On average 116.574 individuals were 
surveyed, with a maximum of 124,759 in 1997 and a minimum of 105,079 in 2001. 
The variable ‘Total net personal income (detailed, NC, total year prior to the survey)’ from 
the ECHP is used as the main source for the average income and the income inequality for 
the whole of the population. This variable is regionalised. Income is collected not only for 
each individual in the household so at to measure income per capita   and income 




7 in the household in order to measure income per capita   
and income inequality for normally working people  . Income per capita is 
transformed for the same level of prices using the harmonised indices for consumer prices 
and then is divided by 1000. Income inequality is calculated using the generalised Theil 
entropy index (Theil 1967). This index considers a region’s population of individuals 
 where each person is associated with a unique value of the measured income. 
The total net personal income is the sum of wages and salaries, income from self 
employment or farming, pensions, unemployment and redundancy benefits or any other 
social benefits or grants, and private income. Income inequality within a region is defined 
as  , where   is income share that is individual i’s total income as a 
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6 NUTS I data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden. 
NUTS II data for Germany, Portugal, and the UK. 
7 It is extracted from the variable ‘Main activity status-Self defined (regrouped)’. 
  16proportion of total income for the entire regional population. This index varies from 0 for 
perfect equality to   for perfect inequality.  N log
The average and inequality education level completed are calculated using the 
microeconomic variable ‘Highest level of general or higher education completed’ which 
also is extracted from the ECHP data survey. Individuals are classified into three 
educational categories: recognised third level education completed, second stage of 
secondary education level completed, and less than second stage of secondary education 
level completed. These categories, which are mutually exclusive, allow for international 
comparisons, because they are defined by the International Standard Classification of 
Education. 
The average education level completed was first has been defined by Psacharopoulos and 
Arriagada (1986) and Ram (1990). It corresponds to the educational attainment (or 
educational achievement) and is given by the index  , where   is the 
proportion of the respondents who belong in the   category and   denotes an 
assessment of each category. At the risk of some oversimplification, we assume   for 
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1 2 = S  for second stage of secondary education 
level completed, and   for less than second stage of secondary education level 
completed. This assessment is based upon two critical assumptions. The first one is that an 
increase in the level of education will add a constant quantity to educational attainment, 
whether undertaken by a primary or secondary student, and the second one is that 
acquisition of postgraduate degrees will not add any quality to educational attainment, 
because both graduate and postgraduate degrees belong to the same educational category.  
0 3 = S
Following the work of Thomas, Wang et al. (2001), we calculate the inequalities in 
educational attainment using an education Theil index  . This is defined as 
, where   is human capital share, that is, individual i’s higher 
education level completed as a proportion of total human capital for the entire regional 
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  17the entire population is concentrated in a single educational category, and a maximum of 
.  N log
As a way of controlling for the impact of additional factors, we also examine the impact of 
additional quantitative time-variant variables on income inequality: the average age of 
people  , the percentage of normally working (15+ hours/week) respondents 
, the percentage of unemployed respondents   and the percentage of 
inactive respondents   within a region. The source of these variables is again 
the ECHP data set. Other controls include the economic activity rate of the population 
 and female activity rate   from the Eurostat’s Regio data set. These 
are also time-variant variables. The urbanisation ratio of a region   is 
constructed as the percentage of respondents who live in a densely populated area. Data for 
this variable are only available for 2000 and 2001, and not for all countries. We assume that 
the urbanisation ratio from 1995 to 2001 remains constant. This variable, therefore, 
introduces observed time-invariant effects. A second time-invariant variable is latitude 
. 
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The transformed data set with mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum value 
for each of the variable is reported in Table 4.1
8. The descriptive statistics show that the 
data set is unbalanced, which is amenable to estimation methods that manage potential 
heterogeneity bias. Table 4.1 also depicts that income inequality both for the whole of the 
population and for normally working people have decreased slightly between 1995 and 
2000. Educational inequalities followed a similar declining trend over the period of 
analysis. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 




Dev.  Min Max 
IGE1 1995  ECHP  94  0.42 0.16 0.18 0.83 
  1996    102  0.38 0.17 0.11 0.79 
  1997    102  0.38 0.16 0.14 0.79 





whole of the 
population 
1999    102  0.37 0.15 0.12 0.72 
                                                 
8 Appendix A.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the ECHP quantitative and qualitative variables. 
  18  2000    102  0.36 0.14 0.11 0.74 
 
(Theil index) 
1995-00    604  0.38 0.15 0.11 0.83 
IMN 1995  ECHP  94  9.76 3.54 3.40  18.93 
 1996    102  10.39  3.51  3.43  19.02 
 1997    102  11.30  3.71  3.52  19.09 
 1998    102  11.39  3.74  3.79  19.89 
 1999    102  12.00  3.95  3.88  20.88 








1995-00   604  11.30  3.96  3.40  21.14 
NGE1 1995  ECHP  94  0.24 0.08 0.13 0.49 
  1996    102  0.22 0.09 0.07 0.48 
  1997    102  0.22 0.08 0.07 0.43 
  1998    102  0.23 0.08 0.07 0.43 
  1999    102  0.22 0.08 0.06 0.46 








1995-00   604  14.83  4.56  4.94  29.35 
NMN 1995  ECHP  94  13.19 4.32 4.94  28.42 
 1996    102  13.86  4.13  5.25  27.38 
 1997    102  14.79  4.13  5.20  27.28 
 1998    102  14.83  4.24  5.30  28.11 
 1999    102  15.60  4.51  5.50  29.35 








1995-00    604  0.22 0.08 0.06 0.49 
EMN 1995  ECHP  94  0.66 0.24 0.12 1.17 
  1996    94  0.66 0.24 0.12 1.15 
  1997    102  0.69 0.24 0.12 1.13 
  1998    102  0.83 0.30 0.18 1.28 
  1999    102  0.83 0.32 0.18 1.34 






1995-00    596  0.75 0.28 0.12 1.34 
EGE1 1995  ECHP  94  0.90 0.45 0.21 2.38 
  1996    94  0.89 0.45 0.23 2.42 
  1997    102  0.86 0.46 0.23 2.42 
  1998    102  0.70 0.40 0.21 2.09 
  1999    102  0.72 0.42 0.20 2.06 







1995-00    596  0.79 0.44 0.17 2.42 
AGE 1995  ECHP  94  45.19 2.29  39.76  51.39 
 1996    94  44.90  1.93  41.64  50.80 
 1997    102  45.17  1.86  42.05  51.61 
 1998    102  45.48  1.83  42.40  51.12 
 1999    102  45.68  1.79  40.69  51.06 





1995-00   596  45.40  1.95  39.76  51.61 
LFSTOCK 1995  ECHP  94  52.27  7.24  33.59  67.78 
 1996    94  51.51  7.45  31.20  66.11 
 1997    102  52.19  7.65  33.94  67.95 
 1998    102  53.15  7.35  35.76  70.86 
 1999    102  53.59  7.56  35.77  72.88 









defined)  1995-00   596  52.78  7.39  31.20  72.88 
ECACRA 1995  Eurostat 65 54.90 7.47  42.00  74.80 




acrivity rate  1997  90  56.96  6.91  41.80  72.50 
  19 1998    92  57.34  6.56  42.50  72.30 
 1999    94  57.80  6.64  42.40  72.70 




1995-00   525  57.10  6.85  41.50  74.80 
UNEM 1995  ECHP  94  5.80 3.29 0.00  16.54 
 1996    94  5.73  3.21  1.55  16.03 
 1997    102  5.71  3.18  0.53  15.47 
 1998    102  5.30  3.28  0.00  14.68 
 1999    102  4.75  3.05  0.00  14.93 








1995-00   596  5.28  3.17  0.00  16.54 
INACTIVE 1995  ECHP  94  41.92  5.96  29.21  55.49 
 1996    94  42.75  5.93  31.16  56.11 
 1997    102  42.10  6.10  29.49  56.60 
 1998    102  41.55  6.16  28.88  55.86 
 1999    102  41.66  6.32  27.12  56.72 







1995-00   596  41.94  6.05  27.12  56.72 
ECACRF 1995  Eurostat  65  44.78 10.82 24.00 72.20 
 1996    90  47.45  9.69  23.40  70.50 
 1997    90  47.52  9.42  23.70  71.20 
 1998    92  47.99  8.96  25.10  69.70 
 1999    94  48.87  9.13  26.20  71.30 






1995-00   525  47.79  9.52  23.40  72.90 
Source: ECHP data set and Eurostat’s Regio data set 
The qualitative explanatory variables (time-invariant) organise regions into categories that 
are hypothesised to have some underlying similarity concerning welfare regimes, religion 
and family structure. 
•  Welfare regime: Although the level of welfare is reflected in areas such as power, 
industrialisation and capitalist contradictions, social expenditure can be considered 
as a good proxy of a state’s commitment to welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Following the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera (1996) and Berthoud and 
Iacovou (2004), we use four welfare state categories: social-democratic (Sweden, 
Denmark), liberal (UK, Ireland), corporatist or conservatism (Luxembourg, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Austria) and residual or ‘Southern’ (Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Greece). The hypothesis here is that a country’s welfare policy has an 
important effect on income redistribution and thus on income inequalities. The 
above classification assumes that a country belongs to only one welfare state 
regime. In reality, there is no single pure case because the Scandinavian countries, 
  20for instance, may be predominantly social democratic, but they are not free of 
liberal elements (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.28). 
•  Religion: European regions’ religious affiliation is classified into four categories
9: 
mainly Protestant (Sweden, Denmark, Northern Germany, Scotland), mainly 
Catholic (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, Southern 
Germany, Belgium), mainly Anglican (England) and mainly Orthodox (Greece). It 
is hypothesised that regions with the same religion have close social links so at to 
have similar income inequality levels within-groups of religion, but different 
inequality between-groups. 
•  Family structure: Following the work of Berthoud and Iacovou (2004), we use three 
groups of countries in the study of living arrangement: Nordic (Sweden, Denmark), 
North/Central (UK, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Austria) and 
Southern/Catholic (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). The hypothesis is that a 
country’s family structure plays a significant role in income inequality. 
There is a strong overlap between the classification systems. For instance, social-
democratic welfare state category perfectly overlaps with Nordic family structure one. 
Therefore it is not possible to discern whether differences among categories are attributable 
to welfare state, religion or family structure Berthoud and Iacovou (2004). 
 
5. Regression results 
The empirical analysis exploits the panel structure of the data set, for the 102 EU regions 
included in the analysis over the period 1995-2000, using pooled OLS, FEs and REs 
estimation of the static models and by GMM estimation of the dynamic models taking into 
account the unobserved regional-specific effects. We first report the static regression 
models and then the dynamic ones. 
                                                 
9 Sources: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook;  
http://commons.wikimidia.org/wiki/Image:Europe_religion_map_de.png; 
http://csi-int.org/world_map_europa_religion.php   
  215.1 Estimations of the static model 
In all the regressions of income inequality for the whole of the population, the p-values of 
Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test strongly reject the validity of the pooled OLS 
models, and the p-values of Hausman’s test reject the GLS estimator as an appropriate 
alternative to the FEs estimator. Although the distinction between FEs and REs models is 
an erroneous interpretation (Greene 2003), according to the specification tests, the FEs 
models are the most appropriate. Finally, there is no much difference between the 
significance of the homoskedasticity and the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
matrix estimator. Thus the determinants of income inequality are not sensitive to the model 
specification about the error term. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the FEs and OLS regression 
results, respectively; while the REs results are reported in Appendix A.2. 
In Regression 1, the impact of income per capita   on income inequality   is 
analysed. This equation is unconditioned by any other effects. The relationship between 
income per capita and inequality is negative, but it is not statistically significant. The 
adjusted R-squared shows that income per capita does not explain any variation in income 
inequality in the sample. In terms of goodness-of-fit, it is likely to indicate a poor 
unconditioned model. In the FEs conditional regressions (Regressions 3-9) income per 
capita is positively correlated with income inequality. The higher the income per capita, the 
higher the inequality within a region. A few people can be transferred to higher levels of 
skills, while the remainder have to wait their turn (Lydall 1979). Regional economic 
development seems to increase the occupational choices and the earning opportunities of 
rich people. In all the regressions, however, the coefficients on income per capita are very 
low. For instance, Regression 4 shows that an increase in 1000 Euro of income per capita is 
associated with, on average, about 0.0033 more income inequality measured by Theil 
index. The findings also indicate that the effect of income per capita on inequality is robust 
as it is not sensitive to the model specification. 
) (IMN ) 1 (IGE
The next step of analysis is the introduction of human capital distribution measured by 
educational attainment   and educational inequality  . Regressions 2-9 point 
in the direction that regional educational achievement has probably no influence on the 
resulting income distribution, because the coefficients on educational attainment are not 
) (EMN ) 1 (EGE
  22statistically significant. Thus it is not clear whether a higher educational attainment 
increases the occupational choices and the earning opportunities of the population as a 
whole so as to make societies more egalitarian. Additionally, it is not clear whether 
education seems to facilitate numerous favourable chances for individuals, because it 
reflects abilities, choices and preferences (Hannum and Buchmann 2005). The insignificant 
correlation between income inequality and educational attainment also says nothing about 
the balance between the ‘wage compression’ effect and the ‘composition’ effect (Knight 
and Sabot 1983). Education seems not to expose all economic agents to a common shift 
factor that affects each individual’s income. The empirical results, nonetheless, show that a 
highly unequal distribution of education level completed is associated with higher income 
inequality. This relationship is robust and statistically significant (Regressions 2-4 and 6-9). 
A greater share of high-educated workers within a region may signal to the employers that 
those with less education have lower ability, which may also lead to larger wage between 
high-educated and low-educated workers and thus to higher income inequality. An increase 
in the levels of education of the high-educated people tends to increase income inequality 
as the imperfect competition for positions requiring advanced educational credentials 
increases the wages of educated people even more. Another explanation is that the demand 
for unskilled labour is growing at a slower rate than the demand for skilled labour. Hence, 
the positive relationship seems to interpret the responsiveness of the EU labour market to 
differences in qualifications and skills. 
The remaining regressions include the control variables described earlier. Regressions 3-9 
test for the influence of the average age of respondents  . The fact that age matters 
for income inequality is hardly surprising, as regions with a younger population will also 
tend to have a lower rate of participation in the labour force and young people in work will 
earn less in labour market that rewards seniority, increasing the inequality levels within a 
society (Higgins and Williamson 1999). As the European population is getting older, 
income inequality is decreasing, because elderly and retired people whose income is higher 
than the mature working age cohort have obtained the necessary credentials when they 
were younger and they usually do not intent to acquire higher education so as to improve 
their economic circumstances even more. Hence population ageing seems to matter for 
income inequality. 
) (AGE
  23In order to capture the economic activity characteristics of the regions, the percentage of 
normally working respondents  , and the economic activity rate of total 
population   are included in Regressions 4 and 5, respectively. As expected, 
both variables are negatively associated with income inequality and are statistically 
significant. The higher the level of the economic activity of a region, the lower the income 




This point is further confirmed by the introduction of unemployment (UNEM ) and 
inactivity levels ( ) within a region, as well as by the participation in labour 
market by sex ( ) in Regressions 6 and 7, respectively. The results indicate that 
high unemployment is associated with higher income inequality. Increases in 
unemployment aggravate the relative position of low-income groups, because marginal 
workers with the relatively low skills are at the bottom of the income distribution and their 
jobs are at greater risk during an economic downturn (Mocan 1999). Additionally, 
unemployment insurance, welfare benefits and other forms of income support are not 
enough to offset the loss on income due to the transitory unemployment. In other words, the 
income received through a government transfer payments is lower than the income earned 
through employment. The effect of unemployment on income inequality also reflects the 
inflexibility of the European labour market. European labour conditions, such as the degree 
of centralization in wage bargaining, the existence of a minimum wage, the differences 
among countries with regard to recruitment and dismissal legislation and the differences 
among the European countries concerning unemployment benefit, job-creation policies and 
vocational training programmes (Ayala, Martinez et al. 2002), represent an important factor 
for the differences observed in income inequality across European regions. From a broader 
perspective, the high structural unemployment which characterises most European societies 
is likely to cause loss of current output and fiscal burden, loss of freedom and social 
exclusion, skill loss and long-run damage, psychological harm, ill health, motivational loss, 
and organisational inflexibility among others, which in turn increase income inequality 
(Sen 1997). The coefficients on female economic activity rate in all regressions are 
negative and significant. The impact of the increase in women’s work access (Table 4.1) 
has been to lessen the trend toward greater income inequality caused by aspects of social 
INACTIVE
ECACRF
  24change during the period of analysis (Ryscavage, Green et al. 1992). The fact that income 
inequality for normally working people declined slightly throughout the period of study is 
likely to highlight the higher flexibility of female working conditions and arrangements, the 
more adequate sharing of family responsibility and the more sufficient services for child 
care. Both men and women seem to get more equal opportunities to engage in paid work 
showing a more gender egalitarian society in the EU labour market. 
In Regressions 8 and 9 we introduce a year dummy variable with urbanisation 
 and latitude  , respectively, in order to see whether the effects of 
urbanisation and latitude on income inequality have changed over 1995-2000. The effect of 
urbanisation and latitude is lower in 2000 (Regression 8 and 9, respectively). The OLS 
(Table 5.2) and REs (Appendix A.2) results display the negative correlation between 
urbanisation and inequality. Considering Kuznets’ assumption that urbanisation is a 
measure of economic development, the negative relationship underlines that European 
societies are located in the declining segment of the Kuznets curve. However, this rejects 
Estudillo’s (1997) hypothesis that the heterogeneity of urban areas enhances, rather than 
lowers, inequality. Urbanisation increases perfect competition and eliminate monopoly 
power in the marketplaces, so that the benefits from increasing urbanisation will be more 
equally distributed level of income. High-urbanised regions seem not only to be more 
economically prosperous – the correlation between income per capita and urbanisation is 
positive (0.46) – but also to have less inequality, as a consequence of the negative 
relationship between income per capita and inequality. Remarkably, the OLS and REs 
results show that the latitude variable has the ‘right’ sign and is significant. This result 
suggests that latitude may be a significant determinant of regional income performance. 
The Northern regions exhibit the lowest income inequality levels. On the one hand, latitude 
is likely to highlight the EU North-South divide in terms of income inequality. On the other 
hand, regarding latitude as a good proxy for the effect of a region’s climate on its level of 
productive efficient, it is likely to account for a high proportion of the differences in 
regional inequality levels. Climate in part determines job structure and productivity. Tourist 
places for example tend to favour part-time jobs and low-skilled occupations. The demand 
for unqualified workers is higher in Southern Europe than in Central and Northern Europe. 
) (URBANDPAV ) (LAT
  25In consequence, their wages are low and their employment is often precarious and part-
time. 
Finally, the impact of the qualitative explanatory variables on income inequality 
(Regressions 10-12) is reported in Table 5.2 (OLS results) and Appendix A.2 (REs 
results)
10. The FEs estimator is not provided because there is no within-group variation in 
the dummy variables. 
In Regression 10, the omitted category is social-democratic welfare states. The regression 
results show that all welfare regimes are important determinants of income inequality. 
Social-democratic welfare states, which in theory promote a higher standard of equality, 
have indeed lower income inequality than conservative welfare states in which private 
insurance and occupational benefits play a truly marginal role and corporatism displaces the 
market as a provider of welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990). Social-democratic welfare states 
are more egalitarian than corporatist ones because, in the former, the welfare state 
minimises dependence on the family and allows women greater freedom to choose work 
rather than to stay at home, while, in the latter, state intervention is more modest and kicks 
off mainly when the family’s capacity to service its members becomes exhausted (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Corporatist welfare states have lower income inequality than liberal 
welfare states in which ‘means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest 
social insurance plans predominate’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.26). The latter also are 
more egalitarian than ‘Southern’ (or ‘residual’) welfare states. 
Regression 11 introduces religion as an explanatory variable. Mainly Protestant regions are 
base category. All categories seem to be important determinants of income inequality, with 
mainly Protestant regions having a higher income inequality than Catholic ones which, in 
turn, are more egalitarian than Anglican ones. Orthodox regions have the most inegalitarian 
societies. Finally, it is interesting to note that all family structure and living arrangements 
categories affect income inequality significantly (Regression 12). Nordic family structure 
regions are the most egalitarian societies and Southern/Catholic have the highest inequality. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A.3 for dummy variable definition 
  26Considering the standardised coefficients for the above regressions (Appendix A.4)
11, 
women’s work access explains the largest variation in income inequality. The impact of 
both approaches of economic activity (work access of total population) on income 
inequality is high as well. In contrast, population ageing, unemployment and urbanisation 
explain only a relative small part of the total variation in income inequality. 
 
 
                                                 
11 The standardised coefficient is the standard deviation change in the dependent variable caused by one 
standard deviation change in each explanatory variable. 
  27Table 5.1: FEs: Dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population (IGE1)  
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ADJ  R-SQ  0.0000 0.0313 0.0445 0.0654 0.1343 0.1743 0.1432 0.2704 0.2601 







































NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator 
(robust standard errors). LM TEST is the Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan 1980). HAUSMAN 
TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects. 
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Table 5.2: OLS: Dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population (IGE1) 
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ADJ  R-SQ  0.4233 0.5177 0.5396 0.6970 0.7108 0.7617 0.7672 0.7686 0.8328 0.8066 0.7855  0.8061 
OBS. 604  534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455  455 The static regression results of income inequality for normally working people   are 
quite similar to the regression results of income inequality for the whole of the 
population
) 1 (NGE
12. More specifically, income per capita is positively associated with income 
inequality. This relationship is statistically significant and robust. This behaviour rejects the 
declining segment of the Kuznets’ curve. Thus a low percentage of workers is employed in 
high added value jobs, while the remainder should wait their turn. Once more, the impact of 
educational achievement on income inequality is not clear, as the coefficients on 
educational attainment are not statistically significant; while the results are consistent with 
the current belief that educational inequality is positively correlated with income inequality. 
The latter relationship is also robust. The influence of population ageing is not statistically 
significant. The results display the negative impact of the female participation in labour 
force on inequalities. Finally, the impact of urbanisation and latitude on inequalities is 
stronger in 2000 than in 1995. Nevertheless, the OLS and REs results illustrate the 
ambiguous impact of urbanisation on income inequalities for normally working people, 
contrary to income inequalities for the whole of the population. The OLS and REs 
coefficients on latitude are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence the 
higher the latitude, the lower the income inequality for working people. Similar to income 
inequality for the whole of the population, income inequality for normally working people 
is higher in the Mediterranean countries which offer part-time jobs. As expected, income 
inequality is lower in social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas and in regions 
with Nordic family structures. Swedish and Danish regions are example of this direction. 
Additionally, considering the standardised coefficients, educational inequality, women’s 
work access and latitude explain a high part of the variation in income inequality for 
normally working people (Appendix A.4). 
5.2 Estimations of the dynamic model 
Table 5.3 presents the long-run results for the dynamic income inequality for the whole of 
the population equations (Arellano-Bond estimator). The first column of each model 
specification assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. The last two 
                                                 
12 The FEs, OLS and REs results of income inequality for normally working people are reported in 
Appendices A.5, A.6 and A.7, respectively.  
  30columns show the GMM results for the same model specification regarding the explanatory 
variables are predetermined (column b) or endogenous (column c). The short-run 
parameters and the specification tests (the tests regarding serial correlation and the Sargan 
tests)
13 are reported in Appendix A.8. 
Generally speaking, the exogenous, predetermined and endogenous parameters are similar 
to each other, denoting the robustness of the dynamic results. First, all the equations 
(Appendix A.8) reject the lagged income inequality coefficient is zero. The coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is higher when the explanatory variables are assumed to be 
exogenous, except for Regression 1, and lower when the explanatory variables are 
endogenous, except for Regression 5. Additionally, the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable are statistically significant at the 1% level in most equations. It was 
expected to find that income inequality in the current period depends on income inequality 
in the previous period. The rationale for this result is simple, because income inequality 
does not change very quickly over one year and job mobility is rather low. People do not 
change jobs for psychological, technological and institutional reasons (Gujarati 2003). 
                                                 
13 If the explanatory variables, on the one hand, are strictly exogenous, the specification tests are satisfactory. 
More specifically, the tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence of first-order, but not second-order 
serial correlation in both the homoskedastic and robust case. The Sargan test statistics of overidentifying 
restrictions do not indicate correlation between the instruments and the error term. If the explanatory 
variables, on the other, are predetermined, the specification tests are not satisfactory enough. The null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is rejected but it is not rejected the null 
hypothesis of no second-order, except for 6b equation (homoskedastic case). Additionally, the Sargan tests 
indicate misspecification due to the correlation between the instruments and the error term of the first-
differenced equation. Finally, if the explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous, our estimates 
perform well based on the specification tests. The tests statistics of overidentifying restrictions do not indicate 
misspecification, except for 2c, 3c and 4c equations. The tests regarding serial correlation, once again, reject 
the absence of first-order serial correlation in both homoskedastic and robust estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix of the parameter estimates, but not the second-order serial correlation, except for 6c 
equation (homoskedastic case). Taking into account the specification tests applied to the estimated dynamic 
models, 6c equation (homoskedastic case), where the explanatory variables are endogenous, is the most 
appropriate. It is worth noting that the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the dirrerenced residuals does 
not imply that the estimates are inconsistent, but the presence of second-order autocorrelation would imply 
that the estimates are inconsistent (Arellano and Bond 1991). 
  31Regression 1 depicts that income inequality   increases in the long-run as income per 
capita   increases, thus leading to a positive correlation between the two variables. 
The coefficients are also statistically significant in most equations. For instance, if the 
strictly exogenous income is increased by 1% (by 1000 Euro), income inequality will rise 
by 0.0331 in the long-run. This rejects the declining segment of the Kuznets curve, but is 
likely to accept Lydall’s (1979) hypothesis that only a limited number of people can be 
transferred to higher levels of skills, while the remainder have to wait their turn. This result 
is consistent with the FEs conditional regressions. 
) 1 (IGE
) (IMN
The findings also indicate that income inequality declines over time for a region as the 
human capital variables (educational attainment   and educational inequality 
) decline, only when they are assumed to be endogenous. According to the 
estimated value and assuming, for example, that human capital variables are endogenous, a 
1% increase in coefficient on educational attainment would lead in the long-run to a 
0.3018% increase in income inequality (Regression 2). The effects of educational 
attainment and educational inequality obtained after full adjustment of income inequality 
are positive and statistically significant only when education is endogenous (2c, 3c and 4c 
equations). The combined positive impact of educational attainment and inequality on 
income inequality implies that although educational expansion facilitates numerous 
favourable chances for individuals, rich people’s returns are higher than poor ones and rich 
people have more opportunities to engage in higher paid jobs. Additionally, the positive 
relationship between income and educational inequality highlights the responsiveness of the 
EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. Education is likely to raise the 




The long-run effect of the population ageing   variable on inequality is in most 
equations positive which could reflect that with greater longevity, there will be a growing 
number of elderly people and since their income is lower than the younger people, an 
increasing number of elderly people should lead to a rise in the number of households with 
low income (Estudillo 1997, p.68), but this variable is not statistically significant. 
Regression 4 (4a and 4b equations) shows that the labour force stock   has a 
) (AGE
) (LFSTOCK
  32positive effect on income inequality, but is not statistically significant as well. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the economic activity rate   has the expected sign 
(negative) and is statistically significant at the 1% level (Regression 5). High 
unemployment   is associated with higher inequality in the long-run only when 
unemployment is endogenous. This outcome is consistent with the outcome of the static 
regression models denoting the robustness of the relationship between unemployment and 
inequality. The dynamic models are likely to allow testing whether changes in the short-
term (cyclical) and long-term (structural) unemployment influence changes in income 
inequality. The short-run and long-run impact of unemployment on inequality has the 
‘right’ sign with respect to the literature and the static regression analysis. Finally, the 
impact of the female’s work access   on income inequality is negative and 




6c equation is the most appropriate taking into account the specification tests. In this 
equation, the unemployment and the female participation in the labour force are the most 
significant factors determining income inequality within European regions. More 
specifically, the higher the unemployment level, the higher the income inequality; and the 
higher the female participation, the lower the income inequality. 
  33Table 5.3: Long Run GMM: Dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population (IGE1) 
  REGRESSION (1)  REGRESSION (2)  REGRESSION (3)  REGRESSION (4) 
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NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
  34The dynamic regression results of income inequality for normally working people 
 are quite similar to the dynamic regression results of income inequality for the 
whole of the population
) 1 (NGE
14. As expected, all the equations reject the lagged income 
inequality for working people parameter is zero, because a few workers change job 
within one year. Most people do the same job throughout the whole period of study for 
psychological, technological and institutional reasons. Regarding that income persistence 
is an essential characteristic of rewarding achievement (Lane 1971), the results show that 
most persons remain at the same economic status and receive the same achievement. 
Analysing the long-run coefficients on the determinants of income variations of normally 
working people, income per capita, once more, positively affects income inequality, but 
this impact is sensitive to the model specification in terms of the assumption of the 
determinants (whether they are exogenous, predetermined or endogenous). The results 
also indicate that the long-run impact of human capital distribution on income inequality 
is not clear. Both educational attainment and educational inequality are not statistically 
significant, except for educational inequality in equation where explanatory variables are 
income per capita, educational attainment and inequality, and they are assumed to be 
predetermined. In this case, the higher the educational inequality, the higher the income 
inequality. Since both income and human capital inequalities have decreased slightly 
between 1995 and 2000, more equal education may achieved greater equality in 
economic opportunities and incomes without challenging the European institutions and 
without requiring any major redistribution of capital. Population ageing has an 
ambiguous effect on income inequality, while the female participation in labour force has 
a negative and statistically significant effect. 
                                                 
14 The short-run and long-run GMM results of income inequality for normally working people are reported 
in Appendices A.9 and A.10, respectively. The estimates perform well based on the specification tests. The 
Sargan tests do not reject the overidentifying restrictions, except for 2c and 3c equations. The tests 
regarding serial correlation reject the absence of first-order in all equations. The null hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is rejected in 1a, 1b, 2a, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c 
(homoskedastic case) and 2b (both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic case) equations. Based on 
specification tests, 1a, 1b, 2a, 3a, 3b (homoskedastic case) and 2b (both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic 
case) equations are the most appropriate models. 
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6. Concluding remarks and further research 
Different static and dynamic panel data analyses have been conducted in order to 
examine how microeconomic changes in educational distribution in terms of both 
educational attainment and educational inequality affect the evolution of income 
inequality across regions of the EU over the period 1995-2000. Our methodology 
incorporates variability both across regions and over time. The advantage of dynamic 
over static models is that persistence over time is not only due to the unobserved 
regional-specific effects, but also due to the presence of a lagged income inequality 
among the regressors. Autoregressive models highlight the persistence in income 
inequality both for the whole of the population and for normally working people, because 
income distribution does not change quickly over time. Since the estimated coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is high and significant in all the dynamic specifications, the 
estimated long-run coefficients on the explanatory variables are less efficient and biased. 
Taking into account the specification tests applied to the estimated models, the 
relationship between income per capita and income inequality seems to be positive, no 
matter what income distribution is considered. If so, income per capita does not alleviate 
the inequality increase, rejecting the declining segment of the Kuznets curve. The results 
also are likely to accept Lydall’s (Lydall 1979) hypothesis that only a limited number of 
people can be transferred to higher levels of skills, while the reminder have to wait their 
turn. Moreover, regional economic development seems to increase the occupational 
choices and the earning opportunities not of the population as a whole, but of rich people. 
While the impact of educational attainment on income inequality is not clear, educational 
inequality is associated with higher income inequality. It is human capital inequality that 
seems to matter. It is worth noting that the coefficients on educational inequality are 
higher when dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population 
rather than income inequality for normally working people. Moreover, the adjusted R-
squared of the equations that include income inequality for the whole of the population 
are higher than that of the equations for normally working people. This is likely to depict 
  36that equations with income inequality for everyone indicates better FEs models in terms 
of goodness-of-fit. 
The impact of the population ageing within a region on income inequality is sensitive to 
the definition of income distribution. Unemployment is positively associated to income 
inequality, while work access negatively. The coefficient on inactivity is negative, but 
sensitive to the model specification. Taking into account urbanisation, an increasing 
weight of the urban relative to the rural population means a decreasing income inequality 
for the whole of the population (OLS and REs results). In contrast, the impact of 
urbanisation on income inequality for normally working people is not clear. Hence, the 
impact of urbanisation on income inequality is sensitive to the definition of income 
distribution. Additionally, considering the latitude variable, the results show that income 
inequality (both for the whole of the population and for normally working people) is 
lower in the North than in the South. Finally, considering institutions, the social-
democratic welfare states, the mainly Protestant regions and those with Nordic family 
structures are among the most egalitarian. 
The results have important policy implications as they shed light on the ambiguous 
impact of income per capita on income inequality. They show that improving access to 
education, providing higher quality of education, and generally, increasing educational 
attainment may have not any effect on income inequality. They also indicate that income 
and educational inequality are connected, highlighting the responsiveness of the EU 
labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. Since both income and human 
capital inequalities have decreased slightly between 1995 and 2000, a more equal 
educational distribution may have helped to a greater equality of economic opportunities 
and incomes without challenging the European institutions and without requiring any 
major redistribution of capital. Better-educated people earn more than less-educated 
people. An individual who acquires more education is likely to become more productive. 
Finally, microeconomic changes in human capital distribution measured by inequality 
seem to be more important than measured by average. 
Although our methodology seems to address the question of how changes in income per 
capita, educational attainment and education inequality affect the observed income 
  37inequality, further research is needed. First of all, the fact that only a limited time period 
is available advises caution when interpreting the results. Longer time series will 
reinforce the analysis. A potential limitation of the analysis – which is also a limitation in 
most cross-sectional studies – is the fact that regions are more homogeneous than 
countries, because the regions are subunits of a single national entity (Nielsen and 
Alderson 1997). Regions cannot cover as wide a range of variation in income and 
educational distribution, in economic development and in some unobserved 
characteristics such as institutions and socio-cultural conditions as a cross-national 
sample. Regional boundaries may not define autonomous and internally integrated 
socioeconomic systems with respect to distributional process (Nielsen and Alderson 
1997). Thus the administrative boundaries used to organise the data series do not coincide 
perfectly with the actual boundaries, arising nuisance spatial autocorrelation into data 
(Anselin and Rey 1991). It would be valuable to refine regional economic growth by 
considering data spanning longer periods. Considering the quality of data, the fact that 
people are categorised into three categories with respect to the education level completed 
is a limitation. 
The dynamic models were estimated by Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator which treats 
the dynamic model a system of equations, one for each time period. As has been 
mentioned, this estimator is called ‘difference GMM’ (GMM-DIF). A problem with the 
GMM-DIF estimator is that lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences, 
especially for variables that are close to a random walk (Roodman 2005). Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the efficiency of the GMM-DIF 
estimator may be improved by using an extended system GMM estimator that uses not 
only lagged levels of the instruments for equations in first differences, but also lagged 
differences as instruments for equations in levels (Roodman 2005). This estimator is 
called ‘system GMM’ (GMM-SYS). Hence another suggestion for further research is that 
dynamic models can also be estimated by GMM-SYS. 
Finally, the analysis could be extended to spatial econometrics (i.e. Anselin 1988) as a 
further research. Spatial econometric techniques can provide a natural framework to test 
for the occurrence of interregional externalities, and to estimate their magnitude (Vaya, 
  38Lopez-Bazo et al. 2004). For instance, a spatial autocorrelation analysis may indicate 
whether income inequality and its determinants are randomly distributed over space or 
there are similarities among regions. 
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  44Appendix A.1: Descriptive statistics of ECHP data set 
Year Statistic  Quantitative  variables Qualitative  variables 
               Main activity status    
      Income 
Educational 
attainment Age  Unemployed  Inactive 
Normally 
working Urbanisation 
1995  Obs 120413  119463  125395  7915  55169  61406  26863 
   Mean   9744.58  0.60  44.96          
   Percentage       6.36  44.32  49.33  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  11782.83  0.73  18.23          
   Variance 1.39E+08  0.53 332.35           
   Skewness 8.39 0.78  0.34           
   Kurtosis  311.52  2.27  2.12             
1996  Obs 124663  114529  120413  7685  58933  53214  26863 
   Mean 10163.60  0.60  45.05           
   Percentage       6.41  44.41  49.18  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  11234.33  0.73  18.28          
   Variance 1.26E+08  0.53 334.28           
   Skewness 6.45 0.79  0.35           
   Kurtosis  205.83  2.27  2.12             
1997  Obs 117886  118402  124756  7760  54183  62221  26863 
   Mean 10472.71  0.62  45.22           
   Percentage       6.25  43.64  50.11  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  11529.87  0.74  18.32          
   Variance 1.33E+08  0.55 335.47           
   Skewness 6.87 0.73  0.34           
   Kurtosis  213.47  2.17  2.13             
1998  Obs 113455  115953  117980  6775  50646  59978  26863 
   Mean 10617.48  0.68  45.54           
   Percentage       5.77  43.14  51.09  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  12648.77  0.76  18.32          
   Variance 1.60E+08  0.57 335.66           
   Skewness 16.09  0.60  0.34           
   Kurtosis  1049.18  1.97  2.13             
1999  Obs 108731  112406  113536  5908  48802  58342  26863 
   Mean 11037.64  0.68  45.78           
   Percentage       5.23  43.17  51.61  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  13552.43  0.77  18.33          
   Variance 1.84E+08  0.59 336.04           
   Skewness 30.58  0.63  0.33           
   Kurtosis  3616.64  1.96  2.13             
2000  Obs 104953  107751  108848  5165  46890  56384  26863 
   Mean 11368.55  0.69  46.07           
   Percentage       4.76  43.24  52  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  12884.93  0.77  18.45          
   Variance 1.66E+08  0.59 340.32           
   Skewness 10.55  0.59  0.32           
   Kurtosis  442.83  1.92  2.12             
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Appendix A.2: REs: Dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population (IGE1)  











































































































































(0.0895)***          




(0.0011)***         


















INACTIVE        0.1725 
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(0.0446)*** 
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(0.0241)**    
D W S   C O P R        
   
0.0594 
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OBS. 604  596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513 
 Appendix A.3: Dummy variables definition 
Variable Definition 
Welfare state   
DWSSOC  Socialism (social democratic) 
DWSLIB Liberal 
DWSCORP Corporatist  (conservatism) 
DWSRES Residual  (‘Southern’) 
Religion  
DRLPROT Mainly  Protestant 
DRLCATH Mainly  Catholic 
DRLORTH Mainly  Orthodox 
DRLANGL Mainly  Anglicans 
Family structure   




  47Appendix A.4: Standardised coefficients 
Dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population (IGE1) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IGE1 
  REGR. 1  REGR. 2  REGR. 3  REGR. 4  REGR. 5  REGR. 6  REGR. 7  REGR. 8  REGR. 9 
IMN  -0.6514 -0.3659 -0.3360 -0.0449 -0.1675 -0.0845 -0.1105 -0.2136  0.0526 
EMN   -0.5168 -0.5331 -0.1467 0.0171 0.0877 0.1149 0.1418 0.0624 
EGE1   -0.1598 -0.1185  0.2067 0.2553 0.2854 0.2460 0.1985 0.1545 
AGE     -0.1662 -0.2178 -0.1712 -0.0964 -0.1661 -0.0537 -0.0945 
LFSTOCK      -0.5644      
ECACRA       -0.5712     
UNEM        0.0531   0.1887  0.0501 
INACTIVE          0.1974   
ECACRF          -0.6773 -0.5612 -0.5035 -0.4929 
URBANDPA
V (fixed) 
        
-0.1148  
LAT  (fixed)            -0.4330 
Dependent variable is income inequality for normally working people (NGE1) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NGE1 
  REGR. 1  REGR. 2  REGR. 3  REGR. 4  REGR. 5  REGR. 6 
NMN  -0.3975 -0.0187 -0.0196 -0.0309 -0.1803  0.1063 
EMN   0.0020 0.0023 0.3836 0.1752 0.3665 
EGE1   0.5368 0.5340 0.6557 0.3556 0.4877 
AGE     0.0118 0.0515 0.1522 0.0567 
ECACRF      -0.3757 -0.1102 -0.0985 
URBANDPA
V (fixed) 
    
-0.0883  
LAT  (fixed)        -0.5556 
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Appendix A.5: FEs: Dependent variable is income inequality for normally working people (NGE1) 













































































































YR97*LAT       -0.0002 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001)* 
YR98*LAT       0.0000 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001) 
YR99*LAT       -0.0002 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001)* 























ADJ R-SQ  0.0057  0.0207  0.0209 0.0337 0.1556 0.0682 



























NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) 
denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors). LM TEST is the Lagrange multiplier 
test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the 
Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects. 
 
 
  49Appendix A.6: OLS: Dependent variable is income inequality for normally working people (NGE1) 
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(0.0088)** 
(0.0093)**  










ADJ  R-SQ  0.1566 0.2974 0.2963 0.3557 0.2191 0.4358 0.4512 0.4556 0.4763 




  50Appendix A.7: REs: Dependent variable is income inequality for normally working people (NGE1) 



































































































































   
DWSLIB        0.0888 
(0.0223)*** 
(0.0181)***    
DWSCORP        0.0721 
(0.0234)*** 
(0.0174)***     
DWSRES        0.1482 
(0.0298)*** 
(0.0226)***     
DRLCATH         0.0474 
(0.0171)*** 
(0.0194)**  
DRLORTH         0.1645 
(0.0315)*** 
(0.0331)***  
DRLANGL         0.0412 
(0.0164)** 
(0.0193)**  










OBS.  604 596 596 513 299 513 513 513 513 
  51Appendix A.8: Short Run GMM: Dependent variable is income inequality for the whole of the population (IGE1) 
  REGRESSION 1  REGRESSION 2  REGRESSION 3  REGRESSION 4 
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NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. SARGAN 
TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan 1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a 
constant are included. 
 Appendix A.9: Short Run GMM: Dependent variable is income inequality for normally working people (NGE1) 
  REGRESSION 1  REGRESSION 2  REGRESSION 3  REGRESSION 4 
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NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. SARGAN 
TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan 1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a 
constant are included. 
 
 Appendix A.10: Long Run GMM: Dependent variable is income inequality for normally working people (NGE1) 
  REGRESSION (1)  REGRESSION (2)  REGRESSION (3)  REGRESSION (4) 
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OBS.  400    392    392    325    
NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 